Category Archives: Law: Constitutional Law

Magistrate Judge Orenstein Rules for Apple

Magistrate Judge James Orenstein of the E.D.N.Y has issued a 50-page order in a case similar to the Apple v FBI case that has been in the news. In this case too, the government sought to have Apple defeat the passcode security limit on an iPhone so the government could extract the data pursuant to a valid search warrant.

The opinion is a slam-dunk win for Apple, rejecting the government’s All Writs Act (AWA) request on multiple grounds. Among them is that Apple does not meet the test in the leading Supreme Court precedent, New York Telephone due to Apple’s distance from the alleged crime and the burden to Apple of complying. There’s two constitutional arguments: one on separation of powers, that an absence of prohibition by Congress should not be treated as permission, and one on the implications of the government’s expansive view of the AWA, under which any of us could be conscripted to do things we might hate doing to help the government in investigations or worse. (Judge Orenstein gives the I hope extreme example of a drug company forced to produce an execution drug against its will if the government has no other source of supply.)

Apple also wins on discretionary grounds.

This opinion is a thoughtful and on just about all points persuasive work, and it should be influential as these cases trundle through the legal system.

Posted in Law: Constitutional Law, Law: Privacy | Comments Off on Magistrate Judge Orenstein Rules for Apple

Yahoo Does Apple v FBI

Yahoo! Politics has me on Apple and the slippery slope problem of government claiming powers to draf needed helpers under the All Writs Act.

Posted in Cryptography, Law: Constitutional Law, The Media | Comments Off on Yahoo Does Apple v FBI

Gloomy Interbranch Game Theory

Peter Shane, What Do We Call Options Worse Than “Nuclear?”

Interestingly, every Constitutional stratagem he comes up with for forcing or blocking a Supreme Court nominee seems to have a possible counter-move for the other side. The Constitution really is pretty finely balanced until the Supreme Court mucks it up with decisions like Noel Canning.

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On the Apple v FBI Case

Talking HeadThe government’s attempt to get Apple to build a bespoke operating system so they can brute force access to an iPhone without it erasing its data has led the media to some of us who were in the first round of the crypto wars. Today was my turn. A few seconds on CBS in the Morning, ink in a nice explainer by Steve Lohr in the New York Times. I also spoke to the LA Times and the Wall St. Journal, but I haven’t seen what if anything they made of it.

I presume they found me because I wrote the first US legal article on law and encryption: The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip and the Constitution. There’s also a shorter sequel that some find easier to read, It Came From Planet Clipper.

The Apple case potentially raises at least these major legal issues:

  1. To what extent the government can use the All Writs Act to compel people unrelated to a case to provide unwilling technical support–here, Apple says, 12-40 man-weeks of expert engineering–to the government’s efforts to disable a security system in order to effectuate a search warrant or similar court order;
  2. Whether ordering a firm to write code (here, a bespoke phone OS), is a form of compelled speech violating the First Amendment
  3. Whether ordering a firm to digitally sign that code (or anything else) is an impermissible form of compelled speech
  4. Whether if a court can issue this order requiring assistance to disable a security system without violating the Constitutions, it follows that Congress could also legislate to forbid people from building strong security systems that the government cannot break into unassisted — and, most critically, whether that would mean the government could forbid the deployment of strong cryptographic tools without back doors. (This last issue was the main subject of the two articles I linked to above. It’s not a simple question.)

Although the Apple issue likely will be decided on non-constitutional grounds, the parties are making a record on the constitutional issues with an eye to a set of appeals that could go as far as the Supreme Court. The issues are important and interesting, so the media is right to treat this as a big deal.

Posted in Cryptography, Law: Constitutional Law, Law: Criminal Law, Law: Privacy, The Media | 1 Comment

Purely Hypothetical Questions

Suppose that one became convinced that a member of the Supreme Court was a racist, or had a bias either in favor of a particular religion or against a particular religious view. Would any of these constitute grounds for impeachment and conviction?

Would your answer to this question turn on whether the views manifested in judicial opinions, or only in in-court colloquies, or only in out-of-court writing or speaking?

Posted in Law: Constitutional Law, Law: The Supremes | 2 Comments

Can Governors Prevent Syrian Refugees From Entering Their States? (Updated)

I am confident that in a just world, the answer should be “no”. But we don’t always live in a just world. I wish I had time to write a careful analysis, but I don’t, so here are some first thoughts. Corrections and amplifications welcomed.

UPDATE: This is why I should never blog from memory, at least pre-coffee. This morning I conflated the right to move about within a state — not a clearly established federal right, cf. the aftermath of Katrina — with the right to move about between states, which is quite well established: Sáenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) held that a classification (here, lesser welfare benefits for new residents in their first year) that has the effect of imposing penalty on the right to travel violates the Equal Protection Clause absent a compelling governmental interest. What’s more the Court defined the right to travel interstate as having three parts: the right to enter and leave another State; the right to be treated as a welcome visitor while temporarily present in another State; and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.

That ought to settle it.

Three areas of law seem relevant to the question.

First, immigration law, which is a matter of only federal concern. States do not in any way get to control movement across the international border. So if the feds want to let refugees into the US, they are admitted to the US. Even at airports in states that say they don’t want refugees.

Second, anti-discrimination law. Here, we find more of a patchwork. Rather than a single federal statute prohibiting national origin discrimination, we have a collection of piecemeal legislation. It might be that none of the usual anti-discrimination laws, which are aimed at things like housing and employment, speak to the issue of free movement between states.

Third, and not least, there is the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution, backed up by § 1983 of the federal code (§ 1983 prohibits the deprivation of constitutional and federal statutory rights by persons acting under “color of law”). As I understand it, neither the Equal Protection Clause nor any other part of the Constitution has been definitively held by the courts to create a right of free movement between states. [Note the update above – should be “within” not “between”.] Thus, at least at the Supreme Court level, it is technically an open question whether a state might close its borders to everyone. (The question arose after authorities closed a bridge preventing escape from areas of New Orleans hit by Hurricane Katrina. I have some doubts that a state could seal its border legally other than briefly in response to an emergency, but again, if memory serves the Supreme Court hasn’t prohibited that in so many words.) What is not at doubt, however, is that if a state were to attempt some sort of border control, it must do so in a manner that does not discriminate invidiously. (If they are searching for a White Toyota, it is not invidious to only stop White Toyotas.) The state may not treat its own inhabitants better than those of other states. And it may not discriminate on grounds of race or any other suspect class. I would presume national origin is such a class; whether immigration status qualifies (if only a proxy for national origin) is a little trickier, but I’d hope so.

Somewhat related: Important Freedom to Travel Decision From the DC Circuit (7/11/09); Plenty of Blame to Go Round (IV) (9/11/05)

Posted in Civil Liberties, Law: Constitutional Law, Law: Right to Travel | Comments Off on Can Governors Prevent Syrian Refugees From Entering Their States? (Updated)