Category Archives: Law: Criminal Law

Oren Gross on Torture: Ban It Always, Treat Rulebreakers as Circumstances Warrant

Talk about timely scholarship! Prof. Oren Gross of U. Minn. Law has just published Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1481 (2004).

Here (minus the footnotes) is his conclusion to a long and complex argument, a conclusion which resembles my views, right down to citing Charles L. Black, Jr. approvingly, but ultimately come out somewhat more accepting of the idea that although torture should always be prohibited in order to discourage resort to it in any but the most extreme circumstances, there exist sets of real-life circumstances were torture might be morally justified, and thus would and should be publically pardoned or praised after that fact:

… the official disobedience model imposes a significant burden on public officials. They must act in the face of great uncertainty. At the same time the model does not completely bar the possibility that interrogational torture will be used by officials and later ratified by the public. It simply makes it extremely costly to resort to such drastic measures, limiting their use to exceptional exigencies. As Sanford Kadish notes, “Would not the burden on the official be so great that it would require circumstances of a perfectly extraordinary character to induce the individual to take the risk of acting? The answer is of course yes, that's the point.”

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Posted in Law: Criminal Law | 2 Comments

Phil Carter Notes Probable Jurisdiction

Phil Carter points out that the Patriot Act usefully expands US criminal law jurisdiction to sweep in “crimes committed by or against any U.S. national on lands or facilities designated for use by the United States government”:

Sure enough, Sec. 804 of the USA PATRIOT Act … amends 18 U.S.C. 7, also known as the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction” statute of federal criminal law, to include U.S. military bases and embassies outside of the U.S. Here's the relevant text of 18 U.S.C. 7

Of course, this is of no great value to parties wishing to file civil law suits, and the odds that a US Attorney is going to start investigating Guantanamo seem pretty low. Prosecutions at Abu Ghrabi are firmly in the hands of the military justice system, and it's too soon to tell whether the military honor reflex or the military cover-up reflex will dominate.

But, as noted on Intel Dump, this amendment has borne fruit in the prosecution of a civilian contractor in Iraq for an assault that lead to the death of a CIA detainee. Update: Washiington Post explains the background to the prosecution.

Posted in Guantanamo, Iraq Atrocities, Law: Criminal Law | 1 Comment

Deconstruction of Torture Memo’s Analysis of Criminal Intent

One of the weirder parts of the Torture Memo, which I didn’t write about earlier, was the attempt to suggest that a torturer might be able to benefit from what we lawyers call a ‘pure heart, empty head’ defense: ‘Honest, judge, I didn’t think it was torture.’ The memo tries this on in two implausible ways: (1) The guy doing the damage honestly believes it’s legal; (2) the guy doing the damage isn’t sure it’s really going to be that damaging. Both arguments seem completely inapplicable to the circumstances, neither is convincing, and the legal analysis is muddled. But don’t take my word for it, it’s not my field. Instead, have a look at these three posts by experts.

Update (6/11/04): Also don't miss Eric Muller's excellent comment, Manipulating Doctrine.

Posted in Iraq Atrocities, Law: Criminal Law | 8 Comments

Another Absurd Bush DOJ Prosecution Bites the Dust

Prof. Michael Massinter of Nova Law School reports on a mailing list I frequent that “DoJ's prosecution of Greenpeace, the first prosecution modern history of a nonprofit advocacy group for the nonviolent civil disobedience of its members, ended abruptly this afternoon when, at the close of the government's case, the trial judge ruled the evidence insufficient to create a jury question on the offense of sailor mongering and therefore on the offense of conspiracy to commit sailor mongering, and entered a judgment of acquittal.”

The case was significant as the DoJ was trying to convict an organization for the activities of supporters — the ultimate chilling effect.

Background on the case at TalkLeft: Justice Department Trial Against Greenpeace Begins.

AP says:

U.S. District Judge Adalberto Jordan ended the case after the prosecution rested in the nation's first federal indictment targeting an advocacy group for its protest tactics.

The environmental group was accused of violating a 1872 law, not used in more than a century, when its members boarded a ship to protest the Amazon mahogany lumber that was part of its cargo.

Greenpeace claimed the charges were payback for its criticism of what the group said is lax Bush administration enforcement of international restrictions on mahogany trade.

Six Greenpeace activists spent the weekend in jail after two of them boarded the 965-foot cargo ship APL Jade six miles from its dock in the Port of Miami to protest a 70-ton load of Brazilian mahogany shipment on April 12, 2002.

The organization was indicted 15 months later under a law that had not been used since 1890.

The law was intended to keep boarding houses from luring sailors off inbound ships that were about to arrive with offers of harlots, strong drink and warm beds.

Posted in Law: Criminal Law | 1 Comment

Alberto Gonzales Memo: Paving the Way for War Crimes?

MSNBC has the full text of the memo by White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales. Aside from its fundamental callousness and lack of moral outrage, there are odd things about it.

Gonzales rejects, without discussion, the concept that if armed people are not entitled to POW status they might still benefit from Geneva III, protecting civilians. Or might be subject to basic norms of decency and due process arising from the Constitution which creates the powers he and his boss exercise.

Even stranger is the odd discussion of the War Crimes statute, 18 U.S.C § 2441. Gonzales opines that one good reason for NOT treating detainees as POWs is that not giving them POW status lessens the chance of subsequent prosecutions against their US captors under the war crimes statute.

Why, you might ask, worry about prosecution at all? Is Gonzales aware of a plan to mistreat the detainees? It sure looks that way.

Gonzales's first argument against treating al Queda or Taliban fighters as POWs is that doing so would increase the danger of prosecution for “vague” offenses prohibited by the Geneva convention, namely “outrages upon personal dignity” and “inhuman treatment”. Reading those lines today, in the fullness of hindsight, it is very hard to escape the suspicion that Gonzales knew or suspected the sexual humiliation planned for Arab detainees.

Gonzales's second argument against treating al Queda or Taliban fighters as POWs is that”it is difficult to predict the needs and circumstances that could arise in the course of the war on terrorism.” (Reading that today, it seems to mean “we might need to torture people”.)

Gonzales's third reason for treating is the legally weirdest of all:

“it is difficult to predict the motives of prosecutors and independent counsels who may in the future decide to pursue unwarranted charges based on Section 2441. Your determination would create a solid basis in law that Section 2441 does not apply, which would create a solid defense to any future prosecutions.”

I'm scratching my head trying to figure out what this means, especially as Gonzales has a reputation for being pretty smart.

  • Does Gonzales think that the “just following orders” defense will work? I hope not.
  • Does Gonzales think that the courts would accept the President's determination on this as determinative? That's not totally implausible: a court might see the President's official determination as somehow being a political question and hence not reviewable. Except that I don't think any court would do this: the point of the Geneva conventions is to bring decisions like this into law, out of politics. Suppose Bush had ruled that unformed French troops were outside the convention — would that be unreviewable? Unlikely.
  • So, on the assumption that Gonzales is smart, I'm puzzled. Does Gonzales have a bad staff?1 Of course, it could be that Gonzales was making a political not a legal judgement: if the President OK'd it, prosecutors are less likely to prosecute. But to make this the centerpiece of your argument?

The more I look at this thing, the worse it smells.

1 It cannot be that Gonzales has some crafty theory of qualified immunity up his sleeve. Qualified immunity protects a government official from civil liability so long as his/her “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known” i.e. blocks lawsuits when the government actor could have had a reasonable belief that the act was lawful. Trouble is, the only immunity from criminal prosecution is that provided by a pardon. And § 2441 is a criminal not a civil statute. And the only part of §2441 (quoted below) that turns on intent at all is the part that refers to a person who “willfully kills or causes serious injury to civilians” in violation of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Device.

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Posted in Law: Criminal Law, Law: International Law | 7 Comments

Feed the Homeless. Go to Jail.

Unless there's something we're not being told here, this is a sign that some people have lost all sense of morality. Can it really be a CRIME to share your picnic with homeless people? Even if the sharing is premeditated and the picnic somewhat pretextual?

It's legal to feed stray dogs but not hungry people? The ants can have their picnic but not the homeless? You need a FEEDING LICENSE TO GIVE FOOD TO THE HOMELESS IN TAMPA?

3 Arrested During 'Picnic' With Homeless In Park: The feud between the group Food Not Bombs and the police has been going on since at least March 21. Group members, many of whom are students at the University of South Florida, say it is their right to feed anyone, anywhere they see the need.

City officials say any group wanting to gather in the park must pay an application fee and buy insurance. Mayor Pam Iorio has said Massey Park does not have the facilities necessary for feeding the homeless.

Durkin said the group could also affiliate with a recognized feeding organization.

Members of Food Not Bombs, including Anthony Schmidt, say they do not feel they should have to do that.

“It's a contradiction to say we can't have a picnic and share with our friends,'' he said.

(spotted via the aptly-named The American Street)

We should be giving awards to people who feed the hungry, not arresting them.

How low can we go?

Posted in Florida, Law: Criminal Law | 1 Comment