Category Archives: Law: Internet Law

Twitter Defamation, Sec. 230 and the Dendrite Principles

From the skimpy facts this sounds like (1) some Twitter user posted something pretending to be Tony La Russa; (2) Tony La Russa sued Twitter; (3) Section 230 of the CDA will block the defamation (but not the IP) claims. That said, it's a little hard to imagine how a trademark claim would work here — where's the likelihood of confusion? — but again without seeing the offending text it's hard to say much. For example, it might be a suit against Twitter and John Doe, in order to get Doe's identity, and the TM claim is there to avoid jurisdictional issues.

La Russa sues Twitter over false page: Cards manager says reputation damaged by fake 'Tweets'

Cardinals manager Tony La Russa filed suit against the social networking internet site Twitter.com last month, claiming that a page on the site that falsely used his name caused him to suffer “significant emotional distress [and] damage to reputation,” the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported Thursday.

La Russa is suing for trademark infringement, trademark dilution and misappropriation of name and likeness.

The website removed the false page shortly after the lawsuit was filed, the paper reported, and La Russa said Wednesday he thought the “issue was done.” He declined to elaborate.

The lawsuit includes a screenshot of the page and several “Tweets” associated with La Russa's name, two of which include distasteful references to Darryl Kile and Josh Hancock, Cardinals pitchers who died in 2002 and 2007.

If this is a John Doe case, does that make it the first against Twitter? Will the court apply the Dendrite test? I think it should.

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CCR Symposium: What is To Be Done?

I've posted a second entry to the Concurring Opinions symposium, What is To Be Done?”.

I doubt it will be as controversial as my first entry, but we'll see.

Posted in Law: Internet Law | 2 Comments

Defending the Constitutional Right to Be Anonymous

Today through Thursday I'm participating in an online symposium at Concurring Opinions in which a whole list of us have been asked to comment on Danielle Citron's article Cyber Civil Rights.

There are already a large number of interesting contributions there, and I've just added mine: CCR Symposium: The Right to Remain Anonymous Matters. It may be controversial.

Posted in Civil Liberties, Law: Constitutional Law, Law: Internet Law | 7 Comments

Phil Reitinger Steps Into the Breach

Washington Post in Microsoft Executive Tapped For Top DHS Cyber Post reports that Team Obama has tapped Phil Reitinger, currently “chief trustworthy infrastructure strategist” at Microsoft, to be Deputy Undersecretary of DHS's National Protections Program division.

I've watched Phil in action since his days at DoJ, and agree with Stewart Baker that he's great for the job and “we should be glad he was willing to take on the responsibility”.

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Florida Teen Films His Suicide On Webcam

It seems I'll be on Channel 10's 6pm news broadcast explaining why tragedies like this one — Pembroke Pines teen broadcasts suicide on webcam — don't mean that we need a special set of cops and regulators for the Internet. (Earlier Channel 10 story, saying up to 1500 people were watching his broadcast; eventually someone called the Pembroke Pines cops, but they broke in too late to save Abraham Biggs Jr.)

The facts are grisly:

A Pembroke Pines teenager told an Internet audience he wanted to kill himself by drug overdose — and then he followed through on his macabre threat while a live webcam captured it, according to the Broward County Medical Examiner's Office.

Abraham Biggs Jr., 19, ingested a lethal mixture of three different drugs early Wednesday, then continued to blog about it while others watched online and egged him on.

The end of the video — which shows Pembroke Pines police busting into his bedroom and discovering his body — remained up on LiveVideo.com as of Friday morning.

Yes, I blame the people involved, not “the Internet”.

Florida has displaced the common-law rule against suicide with some statutory provisions. The most relevant one is aimed at assisted suicide (there's also § 782.081, banning premeditated commercial exploitation of a suicide, but that seems to me not to apply to these facts). Here's the relevant law:

782.08 Assisting self-murder.—Every person deliberately assisting another in the commission of self-murder shall be guilty of manslaughter, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

The obvious legal questions, were a prosecutor to attempt the probably unwise project of indicting one or more of the 'egging on' crowd, are

  1. Does 'egging on' amount to 'deliberately assisting'?
  2. If the statute does make 'egging on' manslaughter, does the First Amendment prevent its operation because it protects this sort of speech?

My gut instinct — and I'll quickly admit this is not my field at all — is that 'egging on' does not amount to 'deliberately assisting' under this statute, which was pretty clearly aimed at physician assisted suicide, and cases where someone gives a depressed person guns or pills. I see the law as criminalizing the provision of tools in the main. Perhaps this could be extended to specialized knowledge, such as telling a depressed person how to make or find a gap in a protective fence at 'Suicide Gulch'. But I don't see it as extending to encouragement — even if a psychiatrist might testify (let us imagine) that the encouragement was a necessary element of the victim's decision.

Good thing, too, because the second question is much harder…

Posted in Internet, Law: Internet Law, The Media | 5 Comments

Someone Needs a New Lawyer?

In Thomson Reuters: The Gang That Couldn't Sue Straight, James Grimmelmann does a takedown on the (seemingly) asinine Thompson Reuters complaint against GMU (!) about a faculty member's distribution of (widely available) free open source firefox plugin Zotero.

(I'm partial to the less powerful but very useful Scrapbook myself, but that's mostly habit.)

That said, it does seem to me that there is one interesting and potentially triable (i.e. not utterly out-to-lunch) issue in the case, and that is the extent to which a contract by a firm with a (state) university can bind its professors. Let's say that the contract at issue does prohibit GMU from distributing software like Zotero (not obvious it does, but bear with me). Does that prohibition bind the GMU faculty? I'm not sure; but to the extent the acts were within the scope of employment, it might. But of course it doesn't bind either James or me, since we're not parties.

And, as James points out, even if it does there's the little question of what sort of damages would be owing. Since the claim is contractual, there's no scope for tort damages, just contract damages, and it's hard to see how those would be measurable here — in which case the courts would usually count them as zero.

Posted in Law: Internet Law | 2 Comments