Category Archives: Econ & Money: Mortgage Mess

It’s the Known Unknowns That Worry Me

Lawrence Cunningham has a soothing historical perspective on the mass of law firm layoffs at Steel, Patience amid Adversity:

In September 2001, after terrorists attacked lower Manhattan, the stock market closed for several days. Corporate finance and deal activity contracted. Law firms lost work. Associates were let go and firms cut back hiring. Eventually, work resumed, with deal flow flourishing.

Then a professor, I went to the library to leaf through the law reviews published in the period just after the bombing of Pearl Harbor that brought the United States into World War II. I also read books about law firms during that period.

Amid World War II, people were terrified, deal flow contracted, associates at large firms were let go and hiring contracted. Scholarship appeared to have been cut back, but in corporate and securities law, did not seem to abate or shift course due to the attacks or resulting war. Eventually, the war ended, markets resumed, expanded, deals flowed, associates were hired, paid, made partner, and prosperity resumed.

Ditto with the episodic booms, busts, scandals and havoc that have ensued—the 1960s electronics boom and bust; the 1970s foreign bribery scandals; the Vietnam conflict and related upheaval; the 1980s savings & laon crisis; the 1980s/90s junk bond boom and bust; the late 1990s / early 2000s telecom boom and bust; and the current crisis, and its coming resolution.

Patience is a virtue for all those affected by adversity, whether economic, military or otherwise.

There's more, but I want to focus the part I quoted. Yes, it's good to learn from history. And indeed, the business cycle tends to repeat. But there are two reasons why I can't quite feel soothed. First, there's the question of which is the right parallel. We're not in 1929 yet, and I still think the smart bet is that we won't get there, but until we see a floor, we can't be sure about that. Especially since just about the entire minority party in Congress, which includes a blocking minority in the Senate, has wedded itself to idiocies such as being for economic stimulus but against spending. Yes, I actually heard a senator say that on the radio last week. And there's lots of it around.

Second, as regards the legal profession we face structural changes not encountered in a while. And I don't mean the likely collapse of the inflated salary structure (and unhealthy billables/month) for the best-compensated associates (and, I'd argue, partners). That's minor compared to the competition from off-shoring legal suppliers in India and elsewhere, not to mention the looming, inevitable, introduction of computer-assisted legal drafting.

Is it time to start writing the contract-generating AI of the future?

Posted in Econ & Money: Mortgage Mess, Law School, Law: Practice | 15 Comments

35 Counties in USA Have Half the Foreclosures — and Boy Are We One of Them

USA Today (which appeared outside my hotel room door) has a very arresting graphic today showing that Most foreclosures pack into a few counties.

4close-map.jpg

More than half of the nation's foreclosures last year took place in 35 counties, a sign that the financial crisis devastating the national economy may have begun with collapsing home loans in only a few corners of the country.

Posted in Econ & Money: Mortgage Mess | 13 Comments

Anatomy of a Panic

Scare talk from [ The Financial Ninja ]: Citigroup, Bank of America: Prisoner's Dilemma, Electronic Bank Runs and Nationalization.

Citigroup © declined 61% from a peak of $4.10 to an intraday low of $1.61 over just 10 trading days. Bluntly put: Citigroup is dead.

Bank of America (BAC) declined 64% from a peak of $7.05 to an intraday low of $2.53 over just 10 trading days. Bluntly put: Bank of America is dead.

Dead actually means dead. It is unlikely they can survive the weekend… and if they do, they most definitely cannot survive the week.

To some extent, talk like this can be a self-fulfilling prophecy…and sometimes market manipulation by short-sellers.

In any case, depositors are as safe as the FDIC. It's the shareholders, and the bondholders, who are at risk, perhaps deservedly so. Which is where the race to the bottom comes in:

The single largest investor in Citigroup is Saudi Prince al-Waleed bin Talal. in November 2008 the Saudi prince increased his stake from 4% to 5%, investing an additional $350 million. In January of 2007, Citigroup had a market capitalization of more than $250 billion. As of Friday's close, the ENTIRE bank is worth about $10 billion. The Saudi prince is down 96% on his 4% stake. Put another way, his original stake was worth about $10 billion in January 2007. Today, he could buy the whole damn mess for the same amount. The prince must be absolutely livid over these developments.

The prince is very exposed to Citigroup. Not only is he an investor, he also does extensive business with the bank. The assets and debts of his financial empire flow through Citigroup in the course of normal business operations. Although his financial dealings are very secretive and opaque, it stands to reason that his advisors would insist he manage this risk. Being long the bank via his ownership stake AND conducting business with the bank is now just too risky. It is the equivalent of doubling up or more in terms of risk on the very same trade. If the bank fails, everything fails. His investment and his business exposures both get severely impaired SIMULTANEOUSLY.

Therefore, the only rational action the prince can take is to shift his business AWAY from Citigroup and towards more stable banks. First the most liquid assets, such as cash deposits would be electronically routed to safer banks. Less liquid assets held in trust from stocks to bonds would be next… all the way down to the least liquid or least transferable assets. Second the credit provided by Citigroup would be swapped out. The prince can't be certain that Citigroup will have the ability to honor the requirements as they come due. This would in fact be an electronic run on the bank.

The prince is damned if he does and damned if he doesn't. The very action of reducing his exposure to Citigroup actually accelerates the death of the bank.

What interests me most about this is that it adds a foreign-relations dimension to the pressure on the Treasury to not just nationalize, but to do so in a way that benefits shareholders at the expense of taxpayers. But of course they could never say that.

Posted in Econ & Money: Mortgage Mess | Comments Off on Anatomy of a Panic

Taking the Back of the Envelope to the Homeowner Bailout

The New York Times tells me that President Obama is proposing fifty billion to bailhelp out three million families who can't make their mortgage payments. That works out to an average of $16,666.66 each. Let's say we're going to help cover two year's payments – that's $694.77 /month. Which sounds like a lot.

But if you borrowed, say, $250,000 at 10% for 30 years, your monthly payment is $2193.90.

Let's imagine there's an insurance piece here (and, to make it really easy, that it's free and credible). Then our hypothetical borrower can refinance at the market rate of 5.27% (very optimistic, I know, given the likely credit history), lowering the monthly payment to $1383.61 Our hypothetical unemployed hard-luck case will still have to come up with $688.84 for the next two years, before the federal money runs out. Is that realistic?

I imagine one thing is that there's going to be more focus on insurance to allow refinance and/or encourage banks to swallow a cramdown and less on monthlies?

Oh heck. Should have started by reading Calculated Risk. According to Obama Housing Plan, it's $75 billion, and the NYT summary left out all the good details:

The plan contains two separate programs. One program is aimed at 4 to 5 million struggling homeowners with loans owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac to help them refinance their mortgages through the two institutions.

A separate program would potentially help 3 to 4 million homeowners by allowing them to modify their mortgages to lower monthly interest rates through any participarting lender. Under this plan, the lender would voluntarily lower the interest rate and the government would provide subsidies to the lender.

Under the modification program which would involve government subsidies to lenders, lenders will be responsible for bringing down interest rates so that a borrower's monthly mortgage payment is no more than 38% of their pre-tax income. After that the government program would match the amount reduced by the lender to bring a homeowner's payments down to 31% of their pre-tax income.

And the money will come from stage two of the TARP Funds.

OK, that makes a little more sense. It will help people in the zone to be helped, but not the destitute. And there's lots of vigorish for the banks/servicing companies to create an incentive to do workouts (right now the servicing companies to whom all this is outsourced make much more money on the foreclosure, which is part of the reason they don't try real hard to do workouts).

[Update: I feel a little better noting that from the timestamps the Calculated Risk post wasn't up when I took out the envelope…]

Posted in Econ & Money: Mortgage Mess | 1 Comment

Bailouts

If I were Ford, which has been run soundly enough not to need bailouts, I'd be fairly unhappy about the prospect of $39 billion going to subsidize my improvident and incompetent competitors.

I'm not Ford, and I'm still unhappy about it.

On the other hand, I'm a homeowner but I don't object to $50 billion going to prop up people who cannot afford their mortgages and have fallen behind on their monthly payments. That's so even though only some are 'deserving': “Many took out loans they were never going to be able to afford, while others have since lost their jobs.”

If there's going to be a windfall, I'd just as soon it went to people who let the American Dream beguile them into buying modest homes they couldn't actually afford, whether or not the ultimate blame belongs to them or a fast-talking mortgage broker. Now, if we're subsidizing folks who traded up to McMansions, on the other hand….

Posted in Econ & Money: Mortgage Mess | 4 Comments

TARP: Let a Thousand Lawsuits Bloom

Alison Frankel writes in the Am Law Litigation Daily, Are Whistle-Blowers Lurking Under the Federal TARP?:

There were few regulations in place when the Treasury Department handed out the first $350 billion. Can the recipients be accused of making false claims when they hardly had to document their claims at all?

Yes, according to a new Fried Frank client alert. The three-page analysis by D.C. partners John Boese and James McCullough points to a letter that TARP special inspector Neil Barofsky recently sent to Iowa senator Chuck Grassley, outlining certifications and documentation that TARP intends to require of all those institutions that received funding. “False certifications,” the Fried Frank alert warns, “have been the basis for FCA claims when they were material to the government's decision to release funds or not to seek return of funds.”

Boese told us that the new paperwork requirements will impose post hoc rules for recipients, heightening their exposure. “Qui tam claims are almost a certainty,” Boese said. “Whether there's liability, that's a different question.”

Fried Frank's client memo also notes that the Treasury Department's interim conflict-of-interest and disclosure rules for contractors and financial agents may mean new False Claims Act exposure for businesses that provide TARP-related services, which are required to report any potential violations to the government.

It might be nice to see some of the hogs at the trough get…well trimmed at least.

Posted in Econ & Money: Mortgage Mess, Law: Everything Else | Comments Off on TARP: Let a Thousand Lawsuits Bloom