Category Archives: National Security

The New York Times's Frequent Flyer column today is buried on page C6 so it's easy to miss. That would be a shame, as Fur-Lined Handcuffs and Other Security No-No's is by and about Mark Hatfield, Jr., who is the head of PR for the TSA, and it has its weird moments. The story includes this tidbit:

…you know those little round plastic bowls in which your personal belongings go through the X-ray machine? They are actually dog-food dishes. Seriously. They are nonskid and don't tip over, so they're perfect for this purpose.

I was especially struck by this account of our tax dollars at work:

In the last year, Transportation Security Administration screeners have intercepted more than seven million prohibited items. Typically, it's knives, guns and scissors. But you would not believe how many recreational handcuffs I have seen in property rooms at airports around the country. I don't want to single out J.F.K., but the ones I've seen there were lined in everything from suede to fake fur.

Just as I think lawyers should keep their law licenses current, or shouldn't be judges, so too I think that people who handle classified documents ought to play by the rules. Of course, the rules for classified documents in many cases are even sillier than the state bar system, since the government records system is rampant with over-classification.

So I'm not inclined to be all that charitable about Sandy Berger's admitted misdeeds, even as I think he's entitled to be presumed innocent of the ones he denies.

That said, just as there's a context in which every lawyer knows he's supposed to keep his bar membership current, so too there seems to be a context in which NCS types are sometimes a little fast and loose with the very same meaningless classifications they help create. And part of the context of the standard of this trade is the exploits of Henry Kissinger, who at the end of his government service made off with a truckload of secret documents (prepared by government workers at government expense) on the specious grounds that they were his personal property and had them conveyed to the David Rockefeller estate so that Kissinger could write his memoirs without fear of contradiction. (Kissinger also arranged for the illegal transfer of unique records to the National Archives in order to frustrate FOIA requests.) It took a lawsuit to make him give them back.

There's also a telling contrast between what Berger did when confronted (cooperate with the FBI to the best of his ability, it seems) and what Kissinger did when confronted by the National Security Archive (stonewall for all he was worth). And of course no one ever called the FBI on Kissinger, even though his purloining the documents (the only copies of the documents!) seemed criminal to me then, and seems criminal now.

Who said this?

it “is beyond me” why the huge contract awarded to Brown and Root of Houston and other U.S. firms to build air fields and other facilities in [the war zone] “has not been and is not now being adequately audited. The potential for waste and profiteering under such a contract is substantial.”

Answer below.

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Bruce Schneier's latest Cryptogram has a thought-provoking story:

The other week I visited the corporate headquarters of a large financial institution on Wall Street; let's call them FinCorp. FinCorp had pretty elaborate building security. Everyone — employees and visitors — had to have their bags X-rayed.

Seemed silly to me, but I played along. There was a single guard watching the X-ray machine's monitor, and a line of people putting their bags onto the machine. The people themselves weren't searched at all. Even worse, no guard was watching the people. So when I walked with everyone else in line and just didn't put my bag onto the machine, no one noticed.

It was all good fun, and I very much enjoyed describing this to FinCorp's VP of Corporate Security. He explained to me that he got a $5 million rate reduction from his insurance company by installing that X-ray machine and having some dogs sniff around the building a couple of times a week.

I thought the building's security was a waste of money. It was actually a source of corporate profit.

The point of this story is one that I've made in “Beyond Fear” and many other places: security decisions are often made for non-security reasons. When you encounter a security risk that people worry about inordinately, a security countermeasure that doesn't counter the threat, or any security decision that makes no sense, you need to understand more of the context behind the decision. What is the agenda of the person who made the decision? What are the non-security considerations around the decision? Security decisions make sense, as long as you understand them properly.

There's loads more good stuff in Bruce's latest newsletter by the way.

Ed Felton posts an annecdote that perfectly captures the absurdity of the Security Theater we all endure at airports.

I read once that if everyone has to go to the airport an hour earlier than they used to, the nation annually loses productivity equal to the amount of destruction that the 9/11 bombing cost. A little googling suggests that the number may be as low as half a World Trade Center bombing per year. [One estimate suggests that the annual value of time lost by business and leisure travelers because of airport delays in 1999 was $11.8 billion, while a different (2001) estimate put the cost of the of the WTC clearnup and reconstruction at $23 billion.] Even half a WTC per year is handing terrorists a major, continuing victory. Spending the money on useless show is handing terrorists a giant, continuing victory.

I call it the Bush tax.

Yet another piece of scaremongering about terrorism from the Administration, based on “non-specific intelligence”: CNN.com – Ridge says al Qaeda planning attack. Have you noticed that these announcements happen whenever the Republicans feel they need a bounce in the polls, or when they want a distraction from something? (Today it's the Kerry-Edwards media honeymoon.)

It sure sounds scary…

Al Qaeda plans a large-scale attack on the United States “in an effort to disrupt the democratic process” before November's elections, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge said Thursday.

…but is it based on anything other than the usual background 'chatter'?…

Ridge cited “recent interdictions” for the new warning. He said U.S. officials have no precise knowledge of the time, place or method of attack, but said they are “actively working to gain that knowledge.”

…it wouldn't be a reastatement of the obvious by any chance?…

“We know they have the capability to succeed and they also hold the mistaken belief that their attacks will have an impact on America's resolve,” Ridge said.

…and of course if this were serious information, we'd raise the national 'threat level' above 'yellow' where it seems stuck…

Ridge did not raise the national color-coded threat level beyond its current yellow, or elevated, level.

…but of course going to 'orange' would cost large sums of money since it requires first responders to go into high gear. No, better save that for the Republican convention…