My colleague Stephen Vladeck has a guest column at JURIST in which he looks at Jose Padilla and the Mulligan Problem. It's a very clear explanation that should appeal to both lawyers and non-lawyers alike.
He makes a very scary point about the likelihood of the Court just bouncing it to Congress, and Congress complying... but... suppose Congress did pass a law suspending the writ. Would that law, Milligan or otherwise, be constitutional? Can we rely on Scalia to vote as a good little originalist that "Rebellion or Invasion" as the constitionally prescribed condition for suspending the writ means "Rebellion or Invasion" and not "amorphous fears of terrorism?
Posted by: Paul Gowder at October 28, 2005 09:48 AMResisting the temptation to talk in the third person, I think that _that_ is the real question... The Supreme Court has _never_ even tried to construe the language of the Suspension Clause, most recently bending over backwards to avoid doing so in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). [Although it's possible that the REAL ID Act of 2005 will render the constitutional question presented in St. Cyr entirely unavoidable, but I digress...]
The problem is that the government's argument on this point is immediately self-apparent: Jose Padilla, if he really _is_ a member of al Qaeda, is "invading" the U.S. just as the saboteurs did in _Quirin_... The better hook, I think, would not be the "rebellion or invasion" prong of the Suspension Clause, but the "when . . . the public safety may requite it" prong. Even if this _is_ an "invasion," does the "public safety" really require suspension of the great writ? I sure hope not...
Posted by: Steve Vladeck at October 28, 2005 03:28 PMResisting the temptation to talk in the third person, I think that _that_ is the real question... The Supreme Court has _never_ even tried to construe the language of the Suspension Clause, most recently bending over backwards to avoid doing so in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). [Although it's possible that the REAL ID Act of 2005 will render the constitutional question presented in St. Cyr entirely unavoidable, but I digress...]
The problem is that the government's argument on this point is immediately self-apparent: Jose Padilla, if he really _is_ a member of al Qaeda, is "invading" the U.S. just as the saboteurs did in _Quirin_... The better hook, I think, would not be the "rebellion or invasion" prong of the Suspension Clause, but the "when . . . the public safety may require it" prong. Even if this _is_ an "invasion," does the "public safety" really require suspension of the great writ? I sure hope not...
Posted by: Steve Vladeck at October 28, 2005 03:29 PM